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PATHWAYS TO IMMORTALITY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY, THEOLOGICAL DIRECTION, OR
LEGAL MANDATE
GEORGE P. SMITH, 1I"
I. SCIENCE AND RELIGION: TOWARD A COMMON GOAL?
Science has been defined as "intelligence in action with no holds barred."'
It began as but a simple pursuit of truth but is today fast becoming incompati-
ble with veracity, quite simply because complete veracity leads to a form of
complete scientific skepticism.2 Science was recognized originally, and indeed
valued, as a method to know and understand the world.3 Ever since the time
of the Arabs, in fact, science has had but two simple functions: to enable us
to know and learn about things and to thereby assist us in doing things.4 Now,
as a consequence of the development of the scientific method and the triumph
of technique, science is viewed as a means of changing the world.5
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. Visiting Fellow,
Institute for the Study of Applied and Professional Ethics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New
Hampshire.
1. Hudson Hoagland, Some Reflections on Science and Religion, in SCIENCE PONDERS
RELIGION 17, 18 (Harlow Shapley ed., 1960) (quoting the physicist P.W. Bridgman).
2. BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE SCIENTIFIC OUTLOOK (1931).
3. BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY 18 (1953).
4. Id. at 18. The Greeks, with Archimedes being the exception, were interested only in the
first function. The Arabs, however, were in quest of the elixir of life and the methods needed to
transmute base metals into gold. Id. See generally JOHN B. S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS OR SCIENCE
AND THE FUTURE (1924).
5. RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 98.
The history of science, then, reveals that it is based on creative leaps of imaginative vision
.... The most fundamental principles of science, therefore, are not based on objective
proof; rather they are based on the convictions of those who hold them that this way of
viewing things has relevance and fruitfulness. And even "fruitfulness" can be established
objectively only in the fiuture, through work accomplished in the slow inquiries of the
normal science that results when the new vision has become orthodoxy. In itself,
therefore, and at its inception the new vision is affirmed in risk and therefore in passion,
and essentially it is self-validating, providing reasoned answers and valid tests apparent
only to those who hold its general contours to be true.
LANGDON GILKEY, RELIGION AND THE SCIENTIFIC FUTURE: REFLECTIONS ON MYTH, SCIENCE,
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Probabilities are at the center of scientific inquiry. As such, an absolute
form of truth is not within its scope of realization. Yet science can yield-in
the final analysis-such a high degree of probability, for all practical purposes,
to become certainty.6 Science is, then, a way of ordering experience. It is
ordered knowledge. Its constant testing and referral to the facts of past
experience should be viewed as the only valid way which enables man to
progressively increase both his knowledge and control of the objective world.7
This constant reference back to experience in the quest for knowledge is the
most significant attribute of the scientific method; for from it comes "the
cosmic side of that intellectual scaffolding of religion which we call theol-
ogy."' Scientific theory always is recognized as tentative-with modifications
sooner or later found necessary. The scientific method, then, is one which is
logically incapable of arriving at an ultimate statement. 9
Religion, to a considerable extent, consists in a way of feeling sometimes
more than in a set of beliefs.'" The beliefs are secondary or supportive of
these feelings. There are some things people believe, then, because they feel
as though they are true," and such feelings and beliefs are a source of
mystery and incomprehensibility to the scientific mind. Faith is an unknown
and rather primitive principle to the scientist. 2
Religion, from the standpoint of maintaining its strength, efficiency, or
power, must face change in the same spirit as science does. While religion's
principle may be immutable and eternal, the expression of those principles
requires a continual development. 3
There is little doubt that one of the most curious features seen in the seven-
AND THEOLOGY 45 (1970); see also JACQUES MARITAIN, SCIENCE AND WISDOM 32 (1940);
HERBERT J. MULLER, SCIENCE AND CRITICISM 74-75 (1943) (asserting that science is an
indispensable means for a better life on earth).
6. Hoagland, supra note 1, at 24. The examples used for support of this last statement are:
the certainty that the earth is round, not flat and the realization that biological evolution-by
natural selection-is no longer but a theory, but a high probability. Id. In its fundamental phase,
science is an explanation by description using methods of observation and experiment. The
fundamental assumptions which it makes are practical conclusions of common sense: namely, that
the objects and the events constituting the material universe are in a necessary connection with
one another and that man, by his decisions, can affect the order and events of the universe itself.
W. LAWRENCE SCHROEDER, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 44, 45, 58 (1933).
7. JULIAN S. HUXLEY, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND HUMAN NATURE 20, 21 (1930).
8. Id. at 21.
9. BERTRAND RUSSELL, RELIGION AND SCIENCE 257 (1935).
10. Id. at 14.
11. RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 16.
12. See FILMER S. NORTHROP, SCIENCE AND FIRST PRINCIPLES 274 (1931); see also ALFRED
N. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 262 (1947).
13. ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, THE INTERPRETATION OF SCIENCE 179 (A.H. Johnson ed.,
1961).
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teenth century among natural philosophers--Issac Newton, Robert Boyle,
Thomas Sprat and John Wilkins-was their duality of belief in and commit-
ment to a recognition of a philosophy of science premised upon "a mechanical
universe governed by immutable laws of nature"; yet one which of necessity
allowed for an "omnipotent God who intervened in the natural order from time
to time, breaching these 'laws' of nature" through miracles. 4 At least in
England, this patent ambiguity was heightened by the fact that those in the
forefront of validating and espousing mechanical science were also the
staunchest defenders of miracles--insisting, as such, that miracles could take
place and, indeed, play a prominent role in establishing the very truth of the
Christian religion.' 5
During the middle and latter half of the nineteenth century, science made
its greatest inroads into religion. A credibility gap began to open between what
could be explained within the framework of religion and what could be
explained with the scientific frame of analysis. Some view this gap as
continuing to widen simply because the more scientific discoveries about the
universe that are made, the less explicable they become. Some thirty years ago
it was generally believed that science was gradually attempting, quite
successfully, to explain the entire universe. As scientific facts were presented,
the understanding of the universe continually increased. Today, however, there
is a concern because rationalists and humanists are suggesting that within the
near future science will not be able to say anything fundamental about the true
nature of the universe.16
The advancement of science is blamed often for a loss of religious faith. 7
There is, on the other hand, a belief that the work of science has been the one
factor causing the greater understanding of religious truths today. 8 The
overriding fact to be observed is that normally a scientific advance will show
that statements of various religious beliefs, if they have contact with or are tied
to physical facts, require some sort of modification either through expansion,
reinterpretation, or restatement. If the particular religion is grounded in a sound
expression of truth, the required modification will only "exhibit more
adequately the exact point which is of importance."' 9 A contradiction, in
14. Peter Harrison, Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature, 56 J. HIST. IDEAS
531, 531 (1995).
15. Id. (citing R.M. BURNS, THE GREAT DEBATE ON MIRACLES FROM JOSEPH GLANVILL
To DAVID HUME 12 (1981)); RICHARD S. WESTFALL, SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 26-27 (1958).
16. Christopher Evans, Rationalization, Superstition and Science, in SCIENCE, REASON AND
RELIGION 43, 45 (Christopher Macy ed., 1974).
17. Hoagland, supra note 1, at 17.
18. GILKEY, supra note 5, at 4.
19. WHrrEHEAD, supra note 13, at 179.
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formal logic, is the signal of a defeat." In the evolution of real knowledge,
a contradiction marks the first step in progress toward a victory, and this is the
principal reason why a variety of opinion is tolerated and even encouraged."
Both the scientist and the theologian depend, in the final analysis, on
experience and interpretation. They ask different types of questions not
expecting to receive the same types of answers in return. Science and religion
are reflections of different aspects of man's social experiences. If one can
move beyond popular misconceptions regarding the nature and role of science
and religion, he will feel no conflict between their methods of study and
practice.Y Religion should be devoted to the expression and fulfillment of
final values beyond which no other values can exist.23 A scientific approach
to religion then becomes a noble effort to study the true story of man, the
relation to the source of his being and his duties, privileges, and structure of
values. Science, if pursued within this construct, provides the basic framework
for a new dynamic testament, a new scripture of truth about man and his
destiny.2
4
If the administration of science is to be perfected for the betterment of
mankind, not only are moral ideals needed, but a spiritual vision is needed as
well. The most notable scientific work has flowed consistent with a high
conception of social duty and with a spirit of altruism. Science is a means to
an end, with its values being determined by the end.' Societal progress, as
expressed in the law, in the ultimate analysis, must embrace two complementa-
ry plans of development: scientific research, as well as increased moral under-
standing and appreciation. 6
The equivocal attitudes of Christians regarding their religious faith cannot
be so easily modified. These attitudes are compounded by suspicion,
ignorance, and misunderstanding: suspicion directed against advancing
technology which appears to have a considerable power for good or evil
depending on the technologist who directs it; ignorance from not knowing
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ian G. Barbour, The Methods of Science and Religion, in SCIENCE PONDERS RELIGION
196, 215 (Harlow Shapley ed., 1960).
23. WILLIAM E. HOCKING, SCIENCE AND THE IDEA OF GOD 5, 8 (1944); see also George
P. Smith, II, Religion, Law And Conscience In A Brave New World, in THEOLOGICAL AWARENESS
AND TEMPORAL RESPONSIBILITIES 65 (1985).
24. Ralph W. Burhoe, Salvation in the Twentieth Century, in SCIENCE PONDERS RELIGION
77, 78 (Harlow Shapley ed., 1966); see also Fraser Watts, Are Science and Religion in Conflict?,
9 PSYCHOLOGIST 15 (1996).
25. SCHROEDER, supra note 6, at 60.
26. CARL W. MILLER, A SCENTIST'S APPROACH To RELIGION 29-30 (1947); see also PHILIP
KIcHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT LEGEND, OBJECnVITY WITHOtF
ILLUSIONS (1993).
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sufficiently the true nature of science and technology; and misunderstanding of
the Christian doctrine of creation which has, in turn, led to false ideas about
materialism.27
As viewed today, there is no actual conflict between the statement of
theological principle and the scientific method of inquiry by investigation,
because there is no interrelationship or mutual dependence.' Based on
revelation and faith, theology presents its concepts and principles totally
independent of the scientific theories about nature or speculations regarding the
past.29 Both science and religion present different phases of human activity
and embody distinctive experiences. While religion is fundamentally a spiritual
experience, science is based on "sensuous experience."3 Yet, science and
religion are one in the experience of the revelation they offer to those who
pursue them: the revelation of a supreme fact of mental or progressive spirit
and experience.3" In the end, theology attempts to explain or rationalize
suffering. If human suffering is merely "there," no explanation is demanded
for its existence and no efforts are advanced towards its amelioration.
Theology both demands an answer and prompts a response to the problem of
suffering. In one sense the whole enterprise of biomedicine is a theological
response to the enigma of suffering. The physician seeks to cure. In these
activities of therapeutics and investigation,32 the physician is seeking to
ameliorate suffering.33
II. THE FUTURISTIC CHALLENGE
Within the not too distant scientific future, a human will be cloned34 and
the first person undergoing cryonic or deep-freeze suspension, in other words
a "cryon," will be resuscitated. 35  When perfected, these biotechnological
27. CHARLES A. COULSON, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHRISTIAN 48 (1960); see also
THOMAS A. SHANNON & LISA SOWLE CAHILL, RELIGION AND ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION 2, 3
(1988).
28. GILKEY, supra note 5, at 25.
29. Id.
30. SCHROEDER, supra note 6, at 61.
31. Id. at 62, 63; see also JOHN H. BROOKE, SCIENCE AND RELIGION: SOME HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 11, 16-22 (1991).
32. Kenneth L. Vaux, Topics at the Interface of Medicine and Theology, in
HEALTH/MEDICINE AND THE FAITH TRADITIONS: AN INQUIRY INTO RELIGION AND MEDICINE
185, 209 (Martin E. Marty & Kenneth L. Vaux eds., 1982).
33. Id.
34. Leon R. Kass, Making Babies-The New Biology and the "Old" Morality, PUB. INT.,
Winter 1972, at 18, 41.
35. DAVID WALLECHINSKY ET AL., THE PEOPLE'S ALMANAC PRESENTS THE BOOK OF
PREDICTIONS 162, 163 (1981). The year 2012 is the target date for this resuscitation. It is
predicted that in a few years, a large number of terminally ill and hopelessly aged individuals will
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achievements may guarantee the immortality sought by man for so long. 6 A
plethora of problems-medical, legal, social, economic, philosophical, and
religious-mark the pathway for development and utilization of these scientific
inventions. Indeed, these developments may well unleash what Professor
Gustav Nossal observed in the 1971 Brisbane meeting of the Australian and
New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science as "monsters" of
"molecular biology."'37 The direction of this present inquiry is to explore the
extent to which law should develop its basic postulates and the basic legislative
justifications from science,38 or whether it merely should be responsive in a
non-anticipatory manner to challenges of the "New Biology., 39  Stated
otherwise, in this Essay, I will test the extent to which law marches with
medicine as a partner or "in the rear and limping a little," as well as the
extent to which theological perspectives provide a point of reference or balance
to decision-making in issues of the New Biology.
The central question, which is posited from present experimental work in,
for example, cloning and cryonics, is whether genetic engineering of this nature
should be promoted and encouraged as a basic recognition of the freedom of
scientific inquiry and right to privacy, or whether the common good recognizes
such scientific pursuits as a hindrance to the future development of mankind
be frozen prior to death for re-animation after medical remedies for their various maladies are
discovered. I have coined the word "cryon" to describe individuals who are cryogenically
suspended. This term is not found in the literature.
36. See OSBORN SEGERBERG, JR., THE IMMORTALITY FACTOR (1974); R.C.W. ETTINGER,
MAN INTO SuPERMAN: THE STARTLING POTENTIAL OF HuMAN EVOLUTION-AND How TO BE
PART OF IT (1972); ALAN HARRINGTON, Tan IMMORTALIsT: AN APPROACH TO THE ENGINEERING
OF MAN's DIVINITY (1969); Carolyn Sappideen, Life After Death Sperm Banks-Wills and
Perpetuities, 53 AUst1ALIAN L.J. 311 (1979).
37. Julius Stone, Knowledge, Survival, and The Duties of Science, 23 AM. U. L. REV. 231,
232 n.2 (1973) (citing Address by Professor G. Nossal, Australian & New Zealand Ass'n for the
Advancement of Science, Brisbane Meeting, 1971); see also GEORGE P. SMITH, I, BIOETHICS
AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOcIO-LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW
WORLD (1993). By a 5-4 vote, the United States Supreme Court decided that new forms of
laboratory life were eligible for patenting. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Here,
a new micro-organism was manufactured, which has been effective in breaking up oil spills. Id.
In May 1987, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announced its decision to consider "non-
naturally occurring nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable
subject matter." Claudia Wallis, Should Animals Be Patented?, TIME, May 4, 1987, at 110. But
see Kathleen Day, Church Groups to Fight Patenting ofLife Forms, WASH. POST, May 13, 1995,
atA3.
38. OLIVER W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139 (1952).
39. Warren E. Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, in 1 ETHICAL, LEGAL
AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES To A BRAVE NEW WORLD 211 (George P. Smith, H ed., 1982); see
also Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Genetic Revolution, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 46.
40. Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey, 125 C.L.R. 383, 385 (Austl. 1970). See generally SMITH,
supra note 37.
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and, as such, dictates a policy of cautious containment and review. Viewed as
an instrument to revolutionize, genetic engineering removes natural selection
and favors programmed decision-making which serves to facilitate rational
thinking rather than impede it. Is it shameful reality to acknowledge that man
has the capability to be in control of himself? The lack of control over the
years has spawned a type of "evolutionary wisdom" which, in turn, resulted in
the bubonic plague, smallpox, yellow fever, typhoid, diabetes, and cancer. The
quest for maximum utilization of biological and medical knowledge represents
but one of the tenets of modem "evolutionary wisdom. ' Depending upon
the balance struck between the positive uses of genetic engineering for
advancing societal good and those for individual need enhancement and
satisfaction, genetic manipulation provides a perilous opportunity that has the
capacity either to threaten freedom or enhance it.42
A number of Post-Darwinians in the scientific community assert that there
is no wisdom in evolution-only chance occurrence. However, few would be
willing to unconditionally accept all that nature bestows, particularly disease.
Science, therefore, finds itself in a position of trying to both influence and, in
many cases, control the process of evolution. Some would go so far as to
suggest that dangerous knowledge is never half as damaging as dangerous
ignorance. 43
Basically, it will be shown then that an inherent balancing test to decision-
making, legal and otherwise, should be developed, pursued, and implemented.
Management of the "New Biology" will be linked either to the maintenance of
an a priori standard or a situation ethic. In an a priori standard, balancing
occurs, at least in theory, before the actual standard is set. A situation ethic
considers the consequences of each proposed biomedical action, carefully
weighs them, and concludes with an ethical posture or the structuring of a
penultimate standard of modus operandi.'
What is called for in the final analysis is a new human rights debate among
all participants shaping the directions of the New Biology-lawyers, scientists,
41. George P. Smith, II, Beyond the Land of Oz: Clones, Cyborgs and Chimeras, 2 REPORTS
OF THE SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS ON MEDICAL LAW 15 (1982). See generally THEODOSIUS
DOBZHANSKY, MANKIND EVOLVING: THE EvOLUTION OF THE HuMAN SPECIES 342 (1962).
42. See Michael D. Kirby, Bioethical Decisions and Opportunity Costs, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 7, 7 (1986). The importance of this position is highlighted by Justice Kirby's
present position as Associate Justice of the High Court of Australia. See Australian General
News, Reuters News Service-Australia & New Zealand, Feb. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Australia Library, Allnews File.
43. Kirby, supra note 42, at 7; see also George P. Smith, II, Manipulating the Genetic Code:
Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1976); Symposium, The Law and the Biological
Revolution, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 47 (1973).
44. George P. Smith, II, Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and the New
Biology, PHAROS ALPHA OMEGA ALPHA-HONOR MED. SOC'Y, Jan. 1978, at 10, 10-12.
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technologists-that will reconsider and reshape, as is necessary, the extent to
which both the traditional and redefined rights of humanity are challenged or
complemented by the plethora of medical, legal, scientific, and technological
considerations of today's Brave New World.45 Indeed, "[i]f lawyers are to
continue to play a relevant part in the human rights debate of the future, they
must become more aware of the scientific and technological advances.
Otherwise, they will increasingly lack understanding of the questions to be
asked, let alone the answers to be given."''
III. CLONING
The words "cloning" and "asexual reproduction" are used interchangeably
to describe a technology of nuclear transplantation whereby an enucleated egg
is renucleated with a body cell nucleus from an existing body source, or as the
case may be, a human.47 While laboratory successes with genetic engineering
through the cloning process have been recorded with lower life forms,
vegetables,' and more recently with various enzymes,49 the major obstacle
to human cloning relates to the process of perfecting enucleating and
renucleating techniques for the comparatively small sized human egg cells.
Another obstacle is perfecting techniques which permit a clonal embryo to be
brought to term without extensive experimentation and damage to imperfect
embryos.5 0
45. Michael D. Kirby, Human Rights-The Challenge of the New Technology, 60
AUSTRALIAN L.J 170, 181 (1986). See generally SMITH, supra note 37; THE PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY (Feb. 1991).
46. Kirby, supra note 45, at 181. See generally George P. Smith, II, Biomedicine and
Bioethics: De Lege Lata, De Lege Ferenda, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233, 237 (1993).
47. See George P. Smith, II, Assisted Noncoital Reproduction: A Comparative Analysis, 8
B.U. INT'L L.J. 21, 24-26 (1990). See generally Joshua Lederberg, Experimental Genetics and
Human Evolution, 100 AM. NATURALIST 519 (1966); James D. Watson, Moving Toward the
Clonal Man, 227 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1971, at 50; William A. W. Walters, Cloning,
Ectogenesis, and Hybrids: Things to Come?, in TEST-TUBE BABIES 110, 115 (William A. W.
Walters & Peter Singer eds., 1982).
48. The cloning of vegetables, especially asparagus, for obtaining greater strength and quality
has been quite successful. See The Cloning of a Vegetable, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1978, at 14.
49. Not only have bioengineering technologies developed plants that make their own fertilizer
and new "miracle" drags such as interferon, but in 1982, Collaborative Research Inc. in Waltham,
Massachusetts, announced that their scientists were using bioengineering techniques to clone an
enzyme, rennin, used to coagulate milk for manufacturing cheese. See A Gene-Cloning Success,
CHEMICAL WK., Jan. 27, 1982, at 19; see also YVONNE M. CRIPPS, CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY:
GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE LAW 5 (1980). See generally Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and
Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 399, 400 (1988).
50. See generally Lederberg, supra note 47; Watson, supra note 47. See generally Thomas
F. Lee, Send in the Clones, in THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: CRACKING THE GENETIC CODE
OF LIFE 123 (1991).
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So far as the biologist is concerned, the most compelling argument in favor
of cloning is that the study and perfection of such processes would give rise to
a more advanced study of the factors responsible for cell growth, multiplica-
tion, and differentiation. This would allow for investigation of various disease
etiologies with the obvious purpose of advancing the overall state of
humankind's health, thereby improving genetic endowment." Specifically,
research in combating cancer would be advanced through the study and
perfected use of cloning, as would the study of gerontology. The rate of aging
could be diminished and the human cycle increased. A better understanding
of the body's immunological responses to disease would advance the
management of allergies, infections, wound healing, and organ transplanta-
tion.52
There are a number of other reasons to support scientific investigation into
asexual reproduction and the ultimate production of a human clone. First and
foremost is the positive effect that it would have in providing a solution to
infertility and problems of genetic inheritance. A man who is incapable of
producing sperm or a woman who is unable to ovulate or produce eggs could
be helped by cloning. In the absence of sperm cells, a man could arrange for
the nucleus from one of his body cells to replace the nucleus of an egg cell
from his wife. Similarly, the female without eggs could arrange for one of her
body cell nuclei to replace the nucleus of an egg which would be donated by
another woman. If a successful embryo were produced, it could then be
transferred to the uterus of the nucleus donor or, for that matter, to that of the
egg cell donor for development. 3
The second reason for supporting research here is the effect human cloning
would have on combating genetic anomalies. Thus, in those cases where one
party attempting to conceive was genetically handicapped, cloning with the
genetic material of the other party would avoid transmission of a defect to any
offspring. 4 Here, cloning could serve as a positive force in halting the
deterioration of the human gene pool and, as such, would improve the quality
of health for all and could promote a program of positive eugenics.5
While the human clone would be recognized as a total human being, the
extent to which legal and societal rights and obligations would be granted and
51. See supra note 49; see also ROBERT G. McKINNELL, CLONING: A BIOLOGIST REPORTS
50-77 (1979).
52. Waiters, supra note 47.
53. Id. at 114.
54. Id. at 114-15.
55. GEORGE P. SMITH, I1, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 106 (1981). See generally
George P. Smith, IT Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 435.
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imposed pose difficult problems.56 Having determined that a pre-existing cell
donor will control the genetic destiny of another by cloning, it can be easily
noted that the extent to which the clone has legal rights and obligations is
largely determined by the circumstances surrounding its "birth." It should be
understood that all important aspects of the donor's life will be replicated in the
clone and this will shape expectations of the clone's ability. Indeed, those
expectations will create for the clone an experience of living totally robbed of
openness and indeterminacy.
Perhaps if any real "evil" exists in efforts designed to clone a human, it is
in seeking to relive one's life through another. However, this attitude is not
unique to those who wish to clone. It is shared by a number of "ordinary"
parents who engage in normal procreation.57 Although programmed concep-
tion may well be more humane than chance, the most serious argument
advanced thus far against human cloning is that it disrupts a more authentic
form of self-discovery, or in other words, it compromises personal liberty in the
name of advancing science. 5
8
When human cloning becomes totally feasible, basic decisions will have to
be made about who may be cloned and the circumstances surrounding their
cloning. A number of critics have opposed development of this field of
biomedicine in order to avoid making these difficult decisions. They would
willingly forget the admonition that, "Decisions determine Destiny." They
would rather allow blind circumstances to dictate the future course of events
instead of agonizing over immediate threshold decisions which are flavored
with political dimensions.59
Under the principle of positive eugenics, emphasis is placed on encouraging
56. Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and The Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 7
(1971).
57. See supra note 41.
58. See supra note 41.
59. MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 142, 143 (Peter Singer
& Deane Wells eds., 1985); Francis Canavan, Genetics, Politics and the Image of Man, in 2
ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES To A BRAVE NEW WORLD 7,7-17 (George P. Smith,
Hled., 1982); Bernard D. Davis, M.D., Ethical and TechnicalAspects of Genetic Intervention, 285
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 799 (1971); see also Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cloning: Where Do We Draw The
Line?, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at 65. In November 1993, two physicians-working with the in vitro
fertilization program at the George Washington Medical School in Washington, D.C.-performed
cloning experiments utilizing defective human embryos, fertilized with more than one sperm, that
had no chance of growing into babies. The experiments were to have been limited to six days'
duration (before the most rudimentary signs of a nervous system appeared) before the embryo
cones were to be discarded. In but a few days, however, the embryos died spontaneously, and
the experiment did not proceed. Rick Weiss, The Ethics of Cloning: Who Decides, WASH. POST,
Nov. 16, 1993, at Z12; see also Boyce Rensberger, The Frightful Invasion of the Body Doubles
Will Have to Wait, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1993, at A3.
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those individuals with the best genetic profile to breed. A legislative scheme
which sought to embody the concept of positive eugenics, thereby permitting
only those individuals with superior genetic endowments to clone, would pose
a rather serious constitutional issue. In order to be upheld, a statute of this
nature would require safeguards in order to ensure against large scale cloning
efforts of certain particular types of individuals.6" Absence of these safe-
guards would decrease genetic variation, so important to the process of natural
selection, but also would subject the statute to Equal Protection Clause
challenges under the United States Constitution. 6' Accordingly, if an
American court determined that a cloning statute affected a fundamental right,
the state would need to show that the legislation served a compelling state
interest.62
Obviously, the right to procreate is a fundamental right.63 Yet, the denial
of cloning procedures to those individuals who are capable of reproducing in
the normal manner may not be of such an infringing nature as to trigger the
compelling state interest requirement.64  If it were not regarded as an
infringement, the state would only be required to show that a rational relation
existed between the legislation and an existing legitimate state interest.6' A
court could determine that a state's interest in the propagation of superior traits
is impermissible because it violates the nobility clause of the United States
Constitution or the prohibition against involuntary servitude found in the
Thirteenth Amendment.' On the contrary, were a court to determine that
there is a legitimate state interest in the strengthening of its gene pool through
the propagation of superior traits, it would presumably have little difficulty
sustaining the cloning legislation, thus finding a complementary relation to that
purpose. 67
It is possible that a meritorious claim could be maintained by those
individuals who carry recessive traits by asserting that permitting only
genetically superior people to clone infringes their right to procreate. If
60. See supra note 55.
61. See supra note 55.
62. See generally Francis C. Pizzulli, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A
ConstitutionalAssessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476, 550-51 (1974).
A popular or cult science fiction movie entitled 'Blade Runner," set in the year 2019, probed the
difficulties of clone-like cyborgs called "replicants" who, although limited to four-year life spans,
wrought havoc on the society which created them. See Richard Corliss, The Pleasures of Texture,
TIME, July 12, 1982, at 68.
63. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (noting that limitations upon the freedom to procreate are generally regarded as suspect).
64. Pizzulli, supra note 62, at 550-52.
65. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
66. Smith, Genetics, Eugenics, and Public Policy, supra note 55, at 452.
67. Id.
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successful, such a claim would trigger strict judicial scrutiny of the cloning
legislation and require the state to show a compelling interest for its legislative
action.6 The usual triggering action for the strict scrutiny test is found in
legislation which threatens a basic or fundamental civil right or which contains
a classification which is suspect because of the nature of the group classified
and its disadvantages. 9
Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court rarely has employed the
strict scrutiny test outside the area of racial discrimination. In those
classifications held to be nonracial, it would appear that the Court utilizes a
balancing test and considers three factors: "the character of the classification
in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted
state interests in support of the classification."7 Those legislative classifica-
tions, which are based on individual qualities adjudged wholly or largely
beyond the control of the individual, are regarded as suspect.72
Another argument could be developed asserting that there is an equally
compelling reason why a state interest exists for prohibiting cloning. That
position would be based upon the idea that the use of this technology would
erode fundamental democratic values because it would predict human identity
and thus be inconsistent with the maintenance of free will. This, in turn, would
result in "a diminution of one's capacity to feel free and thus of the exercise of
personal autonomy" that would lead to the weakening of not only primary
social constructs found traditionally within the family unit, but of the very
political institutions that serve "to foster the exercise of individual autonomy
and to inhibit the coercive manipulation of individuals."73 Interestingly, the
Australian National Health and Medical Research Council determined in 1983
that cloning was ethically unacceptable as a new technology simply because
such experiments were not undertaken to promote "accepted family relation-
ship[s]. ' ,7
4
It is obvious from this analysis that cloning legislation at this time in
American society, given the lack of scientific certainty regarding the process
itself and the even greater lack of education and sophistication of the public in
all matters scientific, would foredoom social acceptance of the process.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 451; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
70. See SMrrH, GENETIcs, ETHICS AND THE LAW, supra note 55, at 117.
71. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (addressing classifications disfavoring
illegitimate children).
73. MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & ROY G. SPECE, JR., BIOETHICS AND LAW 416 (1981).
74. Miscellaneous Notes, 9 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 284,297 (1983) (Providing guidelines
on cloning).
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However, this attitude should not prevent continued experimentation in the field
of asexual reproduction and the production of scholarly investigations which
seek to probe the multiple confines of the problem area. It is only by
continued effort that real progress through education can be achieved. 5
Impatience with the unknown and terror over spontaneity must be conquered.
IV. CRYOBIOLOGY
Cryobiology, or the study of low temperature biology, has been both the
source and impetus for maintaining an abiding faith that death may be
conquered. 6 The contributions of cryobiology to medicine include free
preservation, cryosurgery, advanced research into the free preservation of large
mammalian organs, and a plethora of other exciting uses." Although
experimentation and success in transplantation of human organs proceeds with
definite success," the total cryonic suspension of an entire human body and
its revival remains speculative at best.
79
In the 1950s, biologists working with low temperatures coined the term
"cryobiology" to describe those biological investigations which were conducted
well below normal body temperature.8" Cryogenics refers broadly to the
technology of low-temperature experiments, while cryonics pertains to all
75. Seymour Lederberg, Law and Cloning-The State as Regulator of Gene Function, in
GENETICS AND THE LAW 377 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1976); see also
GEORGE P. SMITH, II, MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRYONICS: PROSPECTS FOR IMMORTALITY
(1983); SMITH, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SocIo-LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 37, at 259-73.
76. See generally CURRENT TRENDS IN CRYOBIOLOGY (Audrey U. Smith ed., 1970);
CRYOBIOLOGY (Harold T. Meryman ed., 1966).
77. See generally ROBERT W. PREHODA, SUSPENDED ANIMATION (1969); F. M. Guttman et
al., Whole Organ Preservation: I1 A Study of the Protective Effect of Glycerol, Dimethyl
Sulfoxide, and Both Combined While Freezing Canine Intestine Employing an In Vivo Techique,
6 CRYOBIOLOGY 339 (1970); Peter Mazur, Cryobiology: The Freezing of Biological Systems, 168
SCIENCE 939 (1970); C. R. Valeri & C. E. Brodine, Current Methods for Processing Frozen Red
Cells, 5 CRYOBIOLOGY 129 (1968); George P. Smith, II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial
Insemination and The Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 145 (1968).
78. See ENDRE NIzSALovSzKY, A LEGAL APPROACH To ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 162,
162-68 (1974).
79. See generally BASILE J. LUYET & P. M. GEHENIO, LIFE AND DEATH AT LOW
TEMPERATUREs (1940). As of 1980, it was estimated that there are some thirty-four bodies
interred cryonically-with most of them being in California. David T. Friendly, Chill Strikes the
Cryonics Business, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980, at 9. Currently, one company specializing in
cryonic suspension, Alcor Life Extension Foundation, holds ten frozen bodies and seventeen
frozen heads. Moreover, there are 380 Alcor members signed up to be frozen after a physician
pronounces them dead. Bob Golfen, 10 Frozen Bodies, 17 Heads Await Cryonic New Life, DENV.
POST, Mar. 13, 1994, at B7.
80. PREHODA, supra note 77, at 7.
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disciplines and programs centered on human cold-storage.8 Interestingly, in
1663, an English scientist, Henry Power, composed a mixture of ice and salt
and immersed a jar of eels in it, thereby freezing them. After one night, they
were revived and the phenomenon known as "suspended animation" was
originated. 2
As malfunctioning parts of a human body become subject to replacement,
the procurement and preservation of new organs become of central impor-
tance.8 3 While the molecular bases of freezing damage are not fully under-
stood, it is certain that some whole organs subjected to freezing below a certain
temperature have either been nonfunctional after thawing or have become
nonfunctional within a short time.s' Thus, it is understood that a successful
freezing and restorative organ program requires mastery of more than the mere
ability to successfully freeze the component cells.85
The greatest danger of any person undergoing cryonic suspension is the
need to provide as much expeditious care as possible to protect the brain and
the cells. The brain remains intact for anywhere from three to five minutes, at
normal body temperature, after death. However, the brain can remain without
oxygen for even longer periods of time as the body temperature is decreased
to -196' Celsius. At this temperature all changes virtually stabilize, and the
body may remain in a near perfect state of preservation for an indefinite
period. 6
The body cells would, if left unprotected, literally burst upon freezing
because seventy-five percent of the human body's weight is water and this
water would expand on freezing. Since the prevention of ice crystals inside the
body cells is the basic purpose of perfusion, this method, as opposed to
embalming, is the lynchpin of successful cryonic suspension. In perfusion, a
protective chemical, glycerol, is combined with dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO),
which serves as a rapid penetrant in carrying the glycerol to the cells through
the bloodstream. Consequently, ninety percent of the cells' water is absorbed.
This combination assures that the formation of ice crystals will occur not inside
81. ETTINGER, supra note 36, at 251; BuTERwoRTHs MEDICAL DICTIONARY 369 (Sir Arthur
S. MacNalty ed., 1965).
82. PREHODA, supra note 77, at 56.
83. See Guttman, supra note 77, at 339; Mazur, supra note 77, at 945-46.
84. Mazur, supra note 77, at 945-46.
85. Id.; see also ROBERT F. NELSON, WE FROZE THE FIRST MAN (1968). In 1976, there were
a reported twenty-four bodies in cryonic suspension. Eileen Keerdoja, Souls on Ice, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 16, 1976, at 11.
86. NELSON, supra note 85, at 84. For a description of the cryogenic preparation of a human
corpse, see LuCy KAVALER, FREEZING POINT: COLD AS A MATrER OF LIFE AND DEATH 248-56
(1970).
[V/ol. 15:2
PATHWAYS TO IMMORTALITY
the cell but outside. 7 Since perfusates with a high percentage of glycerol or
DMSO are acknowledged to be toxic to the cells, other chemicals also must be
used in the perfusion.8
V. DEFINING DEATH
There are basically two types of death: clinical and biological.8 9 Clinical
death precedes biological death and normally occurs when one's heart and
respiratory systems stop. The pupils simultaneously become fixed and dilated
and tendon reflexes cease.9" However, from a biological point of view, death
occurs gradually. Thus, even after a recognition of clinical death, certain
biological activities occur.91
Death is classically defined as the cessation of three interdependent vital
body functions-circulation, respiration, and brain activity.92  Cessation of
breathing and loss of heartbeat are still viewed by many as the crucial death
signs.93 Only when artificial means are utilized to sustain these two functions
has it been recognized that new criteria in determining death should be
considered.94 Owing to recent and startling advances in medical technolo-
gy9 and in the field of organ transplantation," it is now recognized that
87. NELSON, supra note 85, at 48.
88. 1d. at 136-56 (providing a very graphic description of the procedure used to prepare an
individual for cryonic suspension).
89. See Edwin H. Albano, The Medical Examiner's Viewpoint, in THE MOMENT OF DEATH:
A SYMPOsIUM 19, 20 (Arthur Winter, M.D. ed., 1969). It has been suggested that there is a third
form or degree of death--cellular death. This degree is not complete until at least two days after
clinical death and refers to the irreversible degeneration or disorganization of individual body cells.
See R.C.W. Ettinger, Lasting Indefinitely, ESQUIRE, May 1965, at 64.
Three additional forms of death have been suggested. The first is apparent death, which
occurs when the outward appearances of vital functions such as respiration, circulation, and motor
activity have ceased. The second is relative death, which is a term used to describe the body state
between the cessation of cardiac and respiratory activity. Complete resuscitation is quite possible
in the early stages of relative death. Finally, there is absolute death, or the condition where the
resuscitation of a body as a whole or even where the resumption of physiological functions of
either individual organs or cells is impossible. See Theodore L Malinin & Vernon P. Perry, A
Review of Tissue and Organ Viability Assay, 4 CRYOBIOLOGY 104 (1967); see also BARRY R.
FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW 710-11 (1987).
90. See generally Albano, supra note 89, at 20; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING
DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF
DEATH (1981).
91. See Albano, supra note 89, at 20.
92. DAVID HENDN, DEATH As A FACT OF LIFE 18 (1973).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 24.
95. See generally Smith, supra note 23; George P. Smith, II, The Medicolegal Challenge of
Preparing For a Brave, Yet Somewhat Frightening New World, J. LEGAL MED., Apr. 1977, at 9;
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death may occur when the brain ceases to function. Such an occurrence is
termed "brain death."97
While some commentators have drawn attention to what they perceive as
sharp distinctions between the legal and the medical definitions of logical
death,9" the law generally treats the matter as a medical question of fact
determined by the "ordinary standards of medical practice"" in each
community; and the laws and customs of each state. The Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act, while establishing procedures for regulating donations of organs,
acknowledges simply that the death of a donor will be determined by the
donor's attending physician.' The Act does not define the act of death, but
rather "appears to operate on the premise that 'death' will be determined by
standards which are generally accepted and applied in the ordinary course of
events."' 01
Meeting in Australia in 1968, the World Medical Assembly argued against
the use of a precise statutory definition of death by noting:
This determination [of the time of death] will be based on clinical judgment
supplemented if necessary by a number of diagnostic aids of which the
electroencephalograph is currently the most helpful. However, no single
technological criterion is entirely satisfactory in the present state of medicine
nor can any one technological procedure be substituted for the overall judgment
of the physician."°
Interestingly, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research unanimously approved, in
drafting the Uniform Determination of Death Act, that death be defined as an
occurrence in which there is:
George P. Smith, II, Death Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Resource
Allocation, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1987).
96. See generally George P. Smith, II, Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for Procuring
Human and Cadaveric Organs: When the Price is Right, 1 MED. L. INT'L 17 (1993); Jesse
Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811 (1970).
97. Julius Korein, Terminology, Definitions, and Usage, 315 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF
Sdc. 7 (Julius Korein ed., 1978); see David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 850 (1986).
98. Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences,
Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death: An Appraisal, 221 JAMA 48, 48 (1972).
99. Id. at 52.
100. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT § 8 (b) (1987) (discussing the various definitions of death
which may be found among state laws serving specific purposes in deciding, for example, issues
of inheritance and survivorship).
101. See Alexander M. Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for
Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 107 n.69
(1972).
102. International Comments: Declaration of Sydney, 206 JAMA 657, 657-58 (1968).
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(1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2)
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain; including the brain
stem. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted
medical standards.'03
The current movement in clarifying the legal and medical concepts of death
is not helpful to individuals presently in cryonic suspension or those anticipat-
ing its use. If one were "suspended" before death, the real issue becomes how
the law should deal with this occurrence, especially from the standpoint of the
disposition of a decedent's estate. Presently there exists in the law of property
a doctrine termed the "wait-and-see" approach which is used to determine
whether an interest vests within the period of time allowed.' °4 This approach
mitigates the harshness of the Rule Against Perpetuities which held that "a non-
vested interest in property failed unless it was certain to vest, if it ever vested,
within the period of the rule"° 5-- twenty-one years plus lives in being.
The same approach could be utilized in developing a working definition of
cryogenic suspension. Thus, cryogenic suspension would be recognized and
defined in law and medicine as that state where, under medical supervision,
body temperature is lowered to such a degree that a condition of temporary
cessation of vital processes is achieved." 6
Modifying the basic tenets of the Rule Against Perpetuities, one could
rather arbitrarily determine that he could remain in a state of cryonic
suspension twenty-one years without fear of being pronounced dead. At the
conclusion of that period, a court would determine whether such a possibility
of a scientific breakthrough existed for a cure of the disease which affected the
person in suspension. If the state of the art had advanced to such a level that
a successful cure for the suspended person's illness existed, then the court
103. MINUTES OF MEETING XI OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, July 9, 1981, at 3 (on
file with the Archives, National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature, Georgetown University,
Wash., D.C.).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1.4 cmt. a (1981).
105. Id. § 1.4 cmt. f.
106. From a medical standpoint, suspension is defined as a "condition of temporary cessation,
as of any vital process." See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1662 (15th ed. 1988).
The term "suspended death" was coined by Robert Ettinger, who defined it as "the condition of
a biologically dead body which has been frozen and stored at a very low temperature, so that
degeneration is arrested and not progressive. The body can be thought of as dead, but not very
dead, it cannot be revived by present methods, but the condition of most cells may not differ too
greatly from that in life." ETTINGER, supra note 36, at 3. Such a definition does not resolve the
problems discussed. Indeed, this definition highlights the need for a working legal-medical
concept of cryonic suspension. See George P. Smith, II & Clare Hall, Cryonic Suspension and
the Law, 17 OMEGA L DEATH & DYING 1 (1986-1987); Curtis Henderson & Robert C.W.
Ettinger, Cryonic Suspension and the Law, 15 UCLA L. REV. 414 (1968).
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could exercise its broad equitable powers of supervision to allow continued
suspension for a period not to exceed ten additional years, at which time a final
determination would be made regarding that status of the cryonically suspended
person. On the contrary, if at the end of the initial twenty-one year period a
judicial determination was made that no immediate or scientific advances
promised the realistic hope of a cure and there was no real chance of revival,
then a decision could be made to thaw the suspended individual and thereby
recognize that death occurred, thus settling the estate.
Obviously, in order to encourage or allow physician-scientists or laypersons
to participate in the preparation of an individual for cryonic suspension before
death, an exculpatory clause would have to be inserted in the contract for
suspension. This would confer on doctors, scientists, and others an immunity
from civil and criminal liability for either failing to find a cure for the illness
or participating in a medical intervention (for example, the initial suspension
itself) subsequently determined by a court to be life-ending. It also would be
wise to have either a judicial recognition of the immunity from a criminal
prosecution for murder in connection with the acts of cryonic suspension
undertaken by a physician on a living individual, or a statute that would admit
the acts undertaken to initiate the suspension as an absolute bar or total defense
to the prosecution.
In those cases where one seeks to have his remains cryonically preserved
after a determination of death is made, the law should be less flexible than in
the cases where the suspension has been undertaken before death. Failure to
recognize death as death would play havoc not only with the law of property
and succession, but would act to destabilize the very social and religious fabric
of society. It is astounding to conceive of a society where there is no ending.
As one commentator has observed, "[d]eath is the source of meaning. If you
could live forever, life would be meaningless. Death is the source of man.
There is no self without death."'107
The approach postulated here for legally and medically recognizing a state
of cryonic suspension has several advantages. It does not allow an estate to go
unsettled for any period of time longer than the original mandate of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Indeed, in most cases the period of determinable
suspension would be much less than that which the Rule allows. This
approach provides hope for those few individuals who believe in cryonic
suspension and revival. Finally, it recognizes an objective form of societal
power in a judge, much akin to that power which society places in physicians
in determining whether to stop life-sustaining processes of comatose or
107. SEGERBERO, supra note 36, at 266 (quoting James Carse, the then-Chairman of the
History of Religion Department, New York University).
[Vol. 15:2
PATHWAYS TO IMMORTALITY
terminally ill individuals.' A judge given a power of this nature would of
course be expected to rely upon scientific judgment regarding the particular
investigation of the suspended individual's medical problem and possibilities
of it being resolved.1"9
VI. A CONTEMPORARY CONUNDRUM
Thomas Donaldson, a forty-six-year-old resident of Santa Barbara County,
California, believed to be dying because of an inoperable brain tumor, made
recent newspaper headlines when he sought judicial recognition of his right to
self-determination by seeking to be "suspended" before he was pronounced
legally dead. 10 Before the tumor spread throughout his brain and damaged
it irretrievably, he wanted his head to be severed from his body and placed in
cryonic suspension. Together with samples of tissue and blood, Mr. Donaldson
expected, over time, that his body would be regrown. With other individuals
using cryonic suspension, the suspension had been performed after they were
pronounced dead. Here, Mr. Donaldson sought to have what he asserted was
his constitutionally protected right to be cryonically suspended pre-mortem. In
order to complete the suspension, Donaldson petitioned the State of California
to exculpate those physicians and their assistants who, in reality, would be
assisting in his murder-suicide."' Head suspensions, as opposed to full body
suspensions, are much cheaper: today costing only $35,000.00, as opposed to
over $100,000.00 for full suspension."12
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health13 presents an interesting situation for the
California courts to ponder as they evaluate this obviously protracted case; for,
108. See generally Daniel M. Schuyler, The New Biology and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
15 UCLA L. REV. 420 (1968).
109. Ettinger has argued that if cryonic suspension were to be recognized as an heroic measure
designed to sustain life, then the concept of "mercy freezing" might have some legal validity and
would thus be defined as "freezing a terminally ill patient before clinical death." EITINGER, supra
note 36, at 260. However, "mercy freezing" is more likely to be viewed as "mercy killing" by
both the legal and medical professions.
110. Cynthia Gomey, Frozen Dreams: A Matter of Death and Life, WASH. POST, May 1,
1990, at DI; see also Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
111. Gomey, supra note 110. See generally Robert W. Ponmer, III, Comment, Donaldson
v. Van de Kamp: Cryonics, Assisted Suicide, and the Challenges of Medical Science, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 589 (1993).
112. GEORGE P. SMITH, I, THE NEW BIOLOGY: LAW, ETHICS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 99-100,
115-29 (1989).
113. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See generally George P. Smith, II, Re-thinking Euthanasia and
Death with Dignity: A Transnational Challenge, 12 ADEL. L. REv. 480 (1990); George P. Smith,
II, Reviving the Swan, Extending the Curse of Methuselah, or Adhering to the Kevorkian Ethic?,
2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 49 (1993).
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in Cruzan, five of the Justices were found to be in agreement that there is
substantive constitutional protection for the right to die.114 Justice O'Connor,
in her concurrence with the majority, found a liberty interest within the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution to sustain and validate this right.' She
implied that when a competent adult makes an informed decision to end his
life, that decision is constitutionally protected. 1 6 The Court held that while
a person does have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment, the state may require the elevated evidentiary
standard of clear and convincing evidence to establish the uncompetent
patient's preexisting desire to terminate treatment." 7 Moreover, the Court
assumed in its holding that rejection of medical treatment by a competent
person includes the right to reject artificial deliveries of food and water."'
The states are able to set and determine whatever standard of evidentiary
proof-a clear and convincing standard of proof-necessary to sustain a claim
of right to die made by a competent or incompetent adult." 9
Mr. Donaldson, however, is a competent adult dying of inoperable brain
cancer. Consistent with Cruzan, a strong argument could be made that he is
within the Court's guidelines in determining the extent of his autonomy and
declining further medical treatment. It is one thing to condone his individual
statement of autonomy and self-determination; yet, it is quite another to
structure, then validate, a state policy promoting an implementation of that
policy by exonerating, both civilly and criminally, those individuals assisting
in actualizing his right.
On January 29, 1992, the California Court of Appeals denied Mr.
Donaldson's request to have his body cryogenically preserved pre-mortem, or
before his terminal illness caused death. 2°  Characterizing Donaldson's
request as profoundly different from the physician-assisted withdrawal of life-
support systems in the more traditional right-to-die cases, the court stated that
one placed on life-support systems takes a "detour" that normally postpones an
immediate encounter with death, with the withdrawal of treatment merely
allowing a delayed death to occur.' 2' With the Donaldson case, however, no
life-extending measures would have been discontinued. Instead, a third party
would have been allowed to kill Mr. Donaldson and thereby hasten
114. Constitutional Law Conference, 59 U.S.L.W. 2272 (1990).
115. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 279-81.
118. Id. at 262.
119. Id. at 275. But see GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS (1989).
120. Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
121. Id. at 63.
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Donaldson's ultimate death encounter. Observing that such actions have never
been given judicial recognition or validated by statute, the court refused to act
in such a manner. Under the facts, the court went on to recognize the
legitimate state interest in protecting society from allowing third parties to
either aid or abet suicide, and held that Mr. Donaldson's assistant, Carlos
Mondragon, could not aid, advise, or encourage Donaldson's own suicide."'
VII. MAINTAINING A BALANCE
Man's dehumanization and depersonalization will not be fostered as a
consequence of the continued quest for mastery of the genetic code. Attendant
to the freedom to undertake research into the exciting and fertile frontiers of
the New Biology is a coexistent responsibility to pursue the work in a
reasonable, rational manner. Pursuing the New Biology in such a manner
requires adequate attention to the safety factor in all aspects of the experimen-
tation."2 The undesirable elements of a "Brave New World" can be tem-
pered only when knowledge is pursued with the purpose of establishing the
truth and integrity of the question, issue, or process.'24 The vast potential for
advancing society and ridding it of a verisimilitude of its present ills is an
obvious good which must be preserved. Little sustained harm can result from
a reasonable pursuit of truth and knowledge; indeed, truth and knowledge are
the basic foundations of any balancing test. If actions are undertaken and
performed with the goal of minimizing human suffering and maximizing the
social good, then the noble integrity of evolution and genetic progress will be
preserved.
Man must endeavor, to be sure, to execute his investigatory and manipula-
tive or creative powers within the scientific laboratory with a rational purpose
and in a spirit of humanism. Moreover, one should seek to minimize human
suffering, thereby contributing to the social goal of allowing each member of
society an equal opportunity to achieve his or her maximum output within the
economic marketplace and to maintain personal integrity and seek spiritual
tranquility. Man must use genetic engineering that contributes to the social
good. There can be no doubt that genetic manipulation provides a perilous
opportunity that may either threaten freedom or enhance it, depending upon the
122. Id. See generally George P. Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward A Policy of
Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 275
(1989).
123. See Smith, supra note 43, at 699-700; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS: MICRO-ORGANISMS, PLANTS, AND ANIMALS 197 (1981); Karen
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balance struck between its use for individual need satisfaction and societal
good.12
5
Restraining scientific inquiry, then, should be limited only to action taken
which is unreasonable. 26 Accordingly, an undertaking would be regarded as
unreasonable when the long- and short-term costs of its effects would outweigh
the enduring benefits that would derive from its study and implementation.
Viewed as being not only an aid to the tragedy of infertility in family planning,
but as a tool for enhancing the health of a nation's citizens, vital scientific
research must continue in the new reproductive technologies and in efforts to
engineer man's genetic weaknesses out of the line of inheritance. Healthier and
genetically sound individuals have a much better opportunity for pursuing and
achieving the "good life," and, in turn, they make a significant contribution to
society's greater well-being.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Few insurmountable problems will arise for law, science, and medicine in
charting the legal aspects of cryonics if a simple recognition is made of the
actual state of cryogenic suspension. Legal mechanisms are already in place
to effectively deal with the consequences of such action. The broad equitable
decision-making powers of a court assure a measured approach to problem-
solving and forestall the need for vigorous and often misguided law-making.
When the complexities of human nature set within the originating forces
of law, science, and medicine are considered and evaluated within theological
perspectives, it will be seen that both the scientific and the theological affirm
the centrality of complementary truths: namely, "that human beings are both
natural and spiritual creatures" and, in reality, "they face both ways."'127
The powers of genetic creation and engineering through cloning and other
procedures must be executed with a rational and enlightened purpose and in a
spirit of humanitarianism or theological awareness. Human suffering, both
present and future, must be minimized whenever possible. Thus, genetic
engineering that contributes to the social good should be fully utilized.
Obviously under this ethical imperative, society must carefully define the social
good 12 -with the enhanced quality of life which genetic manipulation
125. See Kirby, supra note 42, at 7; George P. Smith, II & Thaddeus J. Buns, Genetic
Determinism or Genetic Discrimination?, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 29 (1994).
126. See Russell Scott, Legal Implications and Law Making in Bioethics and Experimental
Medicine, I J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47, 48, 50 (1985).
127. Watts, supra note 24, at 18. See generally Lionel Tiger & Frederick Turner, The Return
of Human Nature, 20 WILSON Q. 13 (1996); STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND
SCIENCE IN AMERICA 69-83 (1994).
128. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL: ENDING REPRODUCTIVE
ROULETTE 30-34 (1974); Joseph Fletcher, EthicalAspects of Genetic Controls, 285 NEW ENO. J.
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promises being evaluated and weighed against the sanctity of life and personal
autonomy or self-representation. 29
"If democracy is to be more than a myth and a shibboleth in the age of
mature science and technology ' 130 a new thoughtful and questioning attitude
must be developed--one that while not viewing scientific discovery with
deference and uncertainty, nonetheless refuses to allow scientific and
technological directions to be set without participation and question.'31 If
moral ordering is to be an end goal of medical-legal decision-making in the
twenty-first century, it is well to remember that "the bedrock of moral order is
religion." '132 Ultimately, then, "[iut is for our society to decide whether there
is an alternative or whether the dilemmas posed by modem science and
technology ... are just too painful, technical, complicated, sensitive and
controversial for our institutions of government."'
33
MED. 776 (1971); see also Symposium, Genetics and the Law, 39 EMORY L.J. 619 (1990).
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131. Id.
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